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In the ongoing debate, there are a set 
of mind-body theories sharing a cer-
tain physicallst assumption: whenever 
a genuine cause produces an effect, 
the causal efficacy of each of the non-
physical properties that participate In 
that process is determined by the 
instantiation of a well-defined set of 
physical properties. These theories 
would then Insist that a nonphysical 
property could only be causally effi-
cacious insofar as it is physically imple-
mented. However, in what follows we 
will argue against the idea that fine-
grained mental contents could be 
physically implemented In the way that 
functional properties are. Therefore, 
we will examine the metaphysical con-
ditions under which the implementing 
mechanism of a particular instance of 
a functional property may be individu-
ated, and see how genuine beliefs 
and desires-Insofar as they track the 
world-cannot meet such conditions. 
I n the current controversy, the crucial question is this: how can men-tal properties be causally relevant and, nevertheless, respect the causal 
primacy of physical properties? We use the phrase 'Causal physicalism' 
to refer to the kind of answer that the dominant perspective provides 
for this question. 'Causal physicalism' is meant to pick out a set of theo-
ries that, despite their divergences in other respects, share a certain 
assumption, namely: that every case of non physical (and, hence, mental 
too) causation has to be conceived as systematically dependent on 
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certain physical processes which underlie it. For whatever the causal 
efficacy of a non physical property may be in a particular case, it cannot 
go beyond the causal powers of the physical properties that are involved 
on that particular occasion. Physical properties appear to the causal 
physicalist as the basic properties of the world, while the rest of the prop-
erties come up as dependent upon those putative basic properties. 1 
Following up Jaegwon Kim, 2 we can see this view as being moti-
vated by two rather plausible principles, namely: Physical Closure and 
Explanatory Exclusion. The first principle affirms the causal closure of 
the physical world: every physical effect has a complete physical cause. 
Explanatory Exclusion, on the other hand, stresses that " ... [t]wo or 
more complete and independent explanations of the same event or phe-
nomenon cannot coexist. "3 This principle just sounds like a reasonable 
way of expressing the conviction that overdetermination cannot abound 
and, consequently, that complete causes must not only be sufficient for 
their effects but also necessary for them. It trivially follows that there 
cannot be more than one complete causal line for each physical effect 
and, given Physical Closure, this causal line must be physical. Hence, 
insofar as a property can have a causal influence on the physical world 
(as mental properties do), its physical import, its causal relevance on 
the physical world, cannot be independent of the causal powers of the 
physical line that constitutes the complete cause of the physical effect at 
stake. In other words, the causal physicalist would insist that a non physi-
cal property F could only be causally efficacious if, for each tokening of 
F, there is a set of physical properties that constitutes its implementing 
mechanism, that is, a set of physical properties about which it is true 
that if this set had not taken place, the effects of the relevant tokening 
ofF would not have occurred. Accordingly, Charles' present desire of 
reading Ulysses could only causally explain Charles' behavior of mov-
ing toward the bookshelf if there is a set of physical properties that 
constitutes the physical implementation of that desire, that is, if there is 
a set of physical properties that bears the relevant counterfactual link 
with that behavior. 
This is, however, a picture that we would like to resist. In fact, we 
intend to demonstrate that causal physicalism is internally inconsistent 
because it relies on two incompatible assumptions, namely: (a) that each 
effect has a complete cause and (b) that effects are not generally 
overdetermined. We will thus argue that, insofar as the causal physicalist is 
bound to stick to the notion of complete cause, she lacks the conceptual 
resources to individuate causal processes in such a way that massive 
overdetermination is averted. This upshot will crucially affect the con-
ditions under which nonphysical properties may be causally relevant. 
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For it will invite us to reconsider the metaphysical principles by which 
implementing mechanisms could at all be individuated. The crucial 
point is that, after a proper elucidation of such metaphysical principles, 
we will conclude that there is no set of physical properties that could 
bear the relevant counterfactual link with the fact that an individual has 
a certain fine-grained mental content, so that it could count as the imple-
menting mechanism of that mental content. In short, we will claim that 
fine-grained mental contents are individuated in such way that they can-
not be physically implemented. 
I. CoMPLETE CAusEs AND OvERDETERMINATION 
The striking of a match may, in the circumstances, be a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the explosion of the building. The match's strik-
ing will thus be, together with plenty of other nonsuperfluous causal 
factors, one of the ingredients of the complete cause of that explosion. 
At first sight, the presence of air may come up as one of those causal 
factors. But, indeed, air cannot be the nonsuperfluous causal factor. 
From the point of view of the causal efficacy of the match's striking, the 
particular combination of oxygen plus hydrogen existing in the air is 
not necessary. It is only oxygen which is necessary for the match's light-
ing. So, it is oxygen, and not air, that should form a part of the causal 
line. But, of course, not all the oxygen that is present in the combustion 
may be strictly necessary for the combustion to take place. So, part of 
the oxygen that is in fact in the room may be neglected. Yet this attempt 
to discount the superfluous elements seems to undermine the possibil-
ity of individuating a causal line that should be counterfactually 
necessary for a given effect. For what applies to oxygen, goes for other 
putative causal factors actually given in the circumstances, so that vari-
ous combinations of different putatively nonsuperfluous causal factors 
will give rise to several causal lines composed of disparate ingredients. 
The different causal lines may not only differ in the combination 
of the critical values for the same parameters. The presence of a certain 
parameter can make the presence of some others redundant. The criti-
cal, minimal value of a certain parameter may not only depend on the 
values of the rest of parameters in its causal line, but also on whether 
certain other parameters are included or not in the causal line. This is, 
in fact, quite a common phenomenon. A lethal poison, for instance, 
produces many different chemical and physiological effects that, in com-
bination, can kill a human being. There are many ways of grouping those 
chemical and physiological processes so that each of the resulting sets 
will still be lethal by itself, even if all of them are instantiated together. 
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Each of these lines will constitute a sufficient condition for the effect, 
but none of them will be necessary in the circumstances and, there-
fore, every effect will be massively overdetermined by its causal lines. 
The causal physicalist concedes that the existence of several inde-
pendent causal lines (each one of them enough to produce the effect) 
for the same effect must be very rare. Our worry is, however, that this rarity 
cannot be ensured if causal lines have to be individuated in terms of their 
physical determinations. Even when those causal lines differ only in 
having different combinations of values for the same parameters, the 
causal efficacy of each line does not require the instantiation of the 
other. This is more obvious when we accept, as in the explosion and 
the poisoning case, the existence of causal lines that involve some dif-
ferential parameters. If the requirement of a complete cause has to be 
of any help to the causal physicalist, it cannot be reduced to the com-
plete cause with all its physical determinations. For, otherwise, we would 
have more than one causal line in each case of causation, and this would 
involve massive overdetermination. 
The causal physicalist might still insist that the different basic causal 
lines involved in the explosion do not constitute a genuine case of 
overdetermination. For they are not, properly speaking, like the case 
in which two darts simultaneously hit a balloon. The situation looks 
closer to the case in which the balloon is impacted by the distinct points 
of a single fork. So, they should be construed as different ingredients 
of the same causal process. This is, in our view, the right answer. 
The problem is that the different causal lines that we have picked out 
are complete and independent in the only sense to which the causal 
physicalist may accede, namely: each causal line is enough to produce 
the effect and, hence, none of them requires the instantiation of any 
other causal line to bring about the effect. In this sense (the only avail-
able one to the causal physicalist, we must insist), two causal lines may 
be independent even if not all of their parameters are. Yet, this notion 
of complete cause and its associated notion of independence en-
tails, as we have seen, that effects are generally overdetermined. 
A central implication of this upshot is that, if we wish to retain the 
idea that overdetermination does not abound, we must accept that certain 
higher-order properties may often be better candidates to the role of 
cause than any set of physical, basic causal lines. This claim will surely 
guide our analysis of the conditions under the implementing mecha-
nism of an instance of higher-order property may be individuated and, 
consequently, our treatment of mental causation. We shall thus con-
clude that, in those cases where a fine-grained mental state causally 
explains the agent's behavior, there is no set of neurophysiological 
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properties that may bear with that mental state the relevant 
counterfactual link to count as its implementing mechanism. 
11. IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS AND 
TRACKING CouNTERFACTUALS 
To elucidate the notion of 'implementing mechanism', let us focus on 
an apparently unrelated issue, namely: the conditions under which the 
causal powers of objects are individuated. It is clear, to begin, that ob-
jects are extremely robust concerning their properties: they tend to 
preserve most of their functional properties through highly diverse 
spatio-temporal conditions. A car, a table, a carburetor, a key, a brake 
do instantiate those functional properties even if we would take them 
to very remote areas in space. Needless to say, the robust stability of a 
particular key regarding the functional property 'being a key' presup-
poses a more general kind of stability: a key cannot continuously change 
its shape or its mass. For, if it did so, it could not preserve the ability to 
open a certain kind of lock in a wide range of circumstances. The kind 
of stability that is proper to objects is connected, as we shall see, with 
the possibility of individuating implementing mechanisms for functional 
properties. 
If, here and úowI=placing a certain object in the right slot is 
counterfactually necessary for the production of a functional effect, then 
there is, here and now, another counterfactual link: every property in the 
bunch that is formed by the stability of the object, is counterfactually neces-
sary for the effect. If the causal efficacy of a particular key is judged to be, 
here and now, necessary for the production of an effect, a lot of properties 
are judged to be features of this particular causal process,just because they 
are bundled by the stability of the key. In other words, we have here a 
counterfactual link between different properties of an object and an effect 
generated by the mere stability of the object, even if some of those 
properties are not causally relevant features for the production of the 
effect at stake. It is in this precise sense that the redness of the key might 
be described as a necessary feature of the process by which this particu-
lar key, here and now, opens this lock: this necessity does not depend 
on the causal relevance of the color of our key. We can call this link 
between the different features of an object a 'stability link' (S-link) and, 
thus, we can say that many features of a causal process are 
counterfactually necessary for the effect, not because they are the caus-
ally relevant features, but because they are S-linked to certain causally 
relevant features. 
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Of course, there is another sense in which we could say that the 
properties of an object are counterfactually linked to an effect. The 
particular shape of our key, for instance, could be regarded as crucially 
relevant to the effect, in the sense that a similar key with a different shape 
would be unable to open the lock. Without this shape, our key would 
have lost its lock-opening abilities. Call this link 'the causally relevant 
features link' ( CRF-link). This is, indeed, the kind of counterfactual link 
by means of which we identify the causally relevant features. 
The distinction between these two kinds of counterfactual links 
(i.e., CRF- and S-links) makes it possible to claim that there are certain 
properties that can be both regarded as superfluous and, nonetheless, 
count as actual features of a causal process. Some might use our intui-
tions about the causal irrelevance of certain features to try to fix the 
implementing mechanism of a certain functional process only in terms 
of the physical features that are causally relevant. Yet, our arguments 
bring to light that nothing important is gained by this move. It is true 
that there is a difference in causal relevance between the calor and other 
properties, but it is also true that we cannot assume that it is possible to 
fix an implementing mechanism in physical terms that could be free 
from the kind of counterfactual link we have called 'S-link'. In this re-
spect, we have shown that our key can be described as having many 
different physical bases that fix its causal ability to open certain locks, 
but we have no reason to prefer one of them over the rest. If we want to 
avoid the self-refuting conclusion that there are many different imple-
menting mechanisms of a particular instance of this functional property, 
we must put together all those different physical bases as being deter-
minations of a single physical implementation of this functional 
property. In fact, those different physical bases are mentioned in the 
first place, as opposed to other putative ones, because they are implic-
itly recognized as being linked together: they are linked together by 
the particular stability of our key. It seems then that one can only obtain 
a sensible notion of 'implementing mechanism' insofar as one accepts 
that S-links do fix the size and boundaries of the relevant implement-
ing mechanism, and one recognizes that the sort of 'over-determination' 
generated by S-links is not the kind of overdetermination that our causal 
ontology tends to exclude. 
Let us now turn to mental causation, and see what we can learn 
from the distinction between S-links and CRF-links as to the determina-
tion of the implementing mechanism of a fine-grained psychological 
process. Imagine that Charles, moved by his desire to read Ulysses, goes 
to the bookshelf and picks up his copy of Joyce's text. How could we fix 
the implementing mechanism that underlies this particular instance of 
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a causally relevant mental property? The causal physicalist assumes that, 
insofar as there is a physical/neurophysiological description that is 
enough to fix any physical outcome, the causal efficacy of the desire has 
to be accounted for in terms of the causal efficacy of a certain physical/ 
neurophysiological causal chain. 
Now, we should notice an important difference between mental 
contents and those cases in which a particular object can be selected as 
the object that is doing the causal job. The difference lies in the fact 
that, insofar as we only pick up the implementing neural state by defin-
ing it as whatever neural state that is causally responsible for the relevant 
movements of Charles' body, we have not yet drawn the required dis-
tinction between the relevant S-and CRF-links. We are just trying to find 
the lower-level properties that back certain CRF-links, without using our 
intuitions about S-links. Then, it is not yet clear what we mean by 'imple-
menting mechanism' in this case. To put it another way, our opponent 
must, at least, grant that a complex neurological state would only count 
as an implementing mechanism of Charles' desire if the ensuing story 
were true of it: 
Charles' desire is implemented by those neurophysiological structures that, 
here and now, do produce the changes in the material world that are 
proper to the causal powers of that desire. But, just as it happens with every 
higher-order property that is implemented by lower-level properties, the 
causal powers of the desire are individuated because, here and now, Charles 
would not have moved toward the bookshelf if he had not moved in the 
particular way he did. 
This story simply seeks to apply to Charles' desire the conditions that have 
previously set for standard functional properties. We are, though, con-
vinced that the analogy fails at a crucial point. Consider the last sentence 
of the paragraph. One may reasonably suspect that a counterfactual like 
"here and now, Charles would have not moved toward the bookshelf if he 
had not moved in the particular way he did" can never be true. In fact, it is 
a very common assumption that the causal powers of a genuine desire are 
individuated in such a way that the detailed way in which our bodies actu-
ally move are not counterfactually linked to the causal powers of the 
desire. To see this, we just need to recall an intuition that most people 
judge fundamental to respect, and that no approach to mental causa-
tion could plausibly deny, namely, that 
... if Charles had been a few more meters away from the bookshelf, his 
desire to read Ulysses, along with some perceptual beliefs, would have led 
him to take a few more steps so that he could reach the bookshelf. 
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In fact, this is the kind of counterfactual that one takes for granted as 
one may claim that Charles' desire to read Ulysses, together with some 
perceptual contents, causally explains his movement towards the book-
shelf, and not just his movement towards a certain location. 4 More 
generally, we could say that whenever we explain someone's behavior 
in terms of her mental contents, we are assuming that a counterfactual 
of that kind must hold, that is, we presuppose that it is proper to a genu-
ine desire (or a genuine belief) that it would have produced different 
physical movements if the circumstances would have partly changed. 
We may refer to this counterfactual as 'the tracking counterfactual', since 
it comes to express the fact that mental states are individuated in such a 
way that they track the world. Thus, Charles' perceptual contents are 
assumed to track, say, certain variations in his position with regard to 
the bookshelf, while the intentional object of Charles' desire is indi-
viduated allowing for variations in the particular way it can been fulfilled 
and presuming that, in combination with the relevant perceptual con-
tents, Charles will track some modifications in the way in which it can 
be accomplished. It trivially follows that the particular way in which 
Charles did moved towards the bookshelf was not counterfactually 
linked to his wish to read Ulysses, and that this is a constitutive feature 
of his behavior being causally explained by a certain desire of his. 
The problem for the causal physicalist is that it is hard to under-
stand how the existence of an implementing mechanism for fine-grained 
mental contents could be consistent with the fact that those contents 
are individuated on the assumption that they track the world. For such 
putative neurological state ought to satisfy what looks like two inconsis-
tent demands. For, on the one hand, that state could not be identified 
as the detailed neurological state that could causally explain Charles' 
behavior in the fully determinate way in which it occurred? since, in this 
case, that neurological state would not sufficiently disregard the details, 
so that it could account for the fact that Charles' desire would still have 
moved his body in a very different way if the circumstances had partly 
varied. But, on the other hand, the neurological state in question should 
be detailed enough to fix the relevant outcome (say, that Charles picks 
up his copy of Ulysses), in contrast with some other effects (like going 
towards his desk, or lying on the sofa). It is hard to see how a neuro-
physiological state could fulfill these two requisites, how it could both 
(i) have the degree of dissociation with the details that the tracking 
counterfactual requires and (ii) be specific enough to causally account 
for the fact that Charles has picked up his copy of Ulysses, instead of 
doing something else. To see this, recall that, so far, the only available 
story about how (ii) could be satisfied is by providing a very detailed 
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explanation about how the exact position of Charles' limbs is fixed by a 
certain antecedent neural condition. The difficulty is, however, that this,. 
way of satisfying (ii) conflicts with the need to disregard the details 
that point (i) imposes. 
There is, however, a more general reason why (i) and (ii) cannot 
be simultaneously satisfied. Suppose, by reductio ad absurdum, that 
there is an implementing mechanism of Charles' present belief B. 
Hence, that implementing mechanism must fix the huge list of dispar-
ate physical dispositions that, according to the tracking counterfactual, 
compose B's causal powers. Dispositions that concern the combination 
of this belief with an indefinite range of desires and other beliefs, as 
well as their corresponding implementing mechanism. It is now easy to 
show, though, that this demand is inconsistent with a distinction that 
sounds constitutive of the very notion of 'implementing mechanism'. 
Trivially, the idea of 'implementing mechanism' involves the possibil-
ity of multiple realization, that is, the possibility that a higher-level 
property were implemented by different mechanisms on distinct occa-
sions. As a result, we may claim that, ifB* is to count as an implementing 
mechanism of Charles' present belief, then it must be possible to de-
limit some circumstances where B could be implemented by B*, and 
some other situations were it should be implemented differently. The 
problem is that, in the case of fine-grained mental contents, this distinc-
tion cannot be drawn. For the list of dispositions that B* is supposed to 
account for, may be enlarged to include any type of counterfactual situ-
ation where Charles' behavior would be explained by his belief that his 
copy of Ulysses is on the bookshelf. So, if the causal physicalist should 
insist that all the dispositions on the list are fixed by the actual imple-
menting mechanism B* of Charles' actual belief that his copy of Ulysses 
is on the bookshelf, she would have to accept that the current imple-
menting mechanism should account for Charles' behavior under any 
kind of circumstance where Charles' behavior could be explained by 
that belief. It follows, then, that there is no way to individuate some types 
of circumstances where Charles' actual belief could not be implemented 
by the current mechanism. Consequently, the causal physicalist would 
have to accept that the same implementing mechanism would have to 
be involved in any counterfactual situation in which Charles might have 
had the belief that his copy of Ulysses is on the bookshelf. 
To avert this distressing outcome, the causal physicalist may be now 
inclined to admit that the mechanism B* that implements Charles' present 
belief B is not supposed to fix the totality of the list of dispositions that 
compose B's causal powers, but only a proper sub-set of them. Imple-
menting mechanism B* would then be individuated by its ability to 
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account for a certain portion of those physical dispositions. The problem 
is that the causal physicalist may have been deprived of any principled 
reason to privilege some of these dispositions over the rest. This is surely 
not a worry that may affect standard functional properties. For, in that case, 
implementing mechanisms have criteria of identity that are independent 
of the fact that they implement some instances of a functional property. 
The problem is that such independent criteria are unavailable for B*, 
since, as we have seen, the only metaphysical principle to which the causal 
physicalist may appeal to pick up B* is the fact that it accounts for some of 
the dispositions that Charles has, here and now, in virtue his belief that his 
copy of Ulysses is on the bookshelf. It is clear, though, that Charles pres-
ently instantiates all the listed dispositions in virtue of having beliefB and, 
hence, it seems that any demarcation criterion that the causal physicalist 
might propose would be fully arbitrary from a metaphysical viewpoint. 
We can then conclude that the conditions under which the imple-
menting mechanism of a higher-level property may be individuated, are 
undercut in the case of fine-grained mental contents. This is so because in 
the latter case there is no means to distinguish between the causal powers 
of a certain fine-grained content, and the causal powers of a particular 
instance of it. And the possibility of drawing that distinction is constitutive 
of the notion of 'multiple realization' and, consequently, of that of 'imple-
menting mechanism'. 
We should say, to close, that this line of reasoning does not preclude 
that, on some occasions, a brain state may appear as the cause or as the 
implementing mechanism of a given mental state. In fact, there are overall 
mental states for which a neurophysiological explanation should be 
expected. Think of the ingestion of lithium and its ability to improve 
depressive pathologies. Yet, even ifwe are glad to acknowledge that the 
lack of a suitable level oflithium may causally explain the proliferation of 
depressive thoughts, we are not thereby assuming a more refined discrimi-
nation in the values of lithium parameter could be counterfactually 
connected to the exact content of those depressive thoughts. This, 
indeed, the kind of transition that we have been trying to block in the 
present paper: even if there may be implementing mechanisms that 
account for the tokening of certain quite general mental states, this cannot 
be so for fine-grained mental contents. For the latter, and not the former, 
are individuated in such a way that they track the world. 
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